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Introduction
The broken model for financing long-term care services and
supports (LTSS) burdens public programs and individuals. A flawed
private long-term care (LTC) insurance market is limited, fails to
mitigate financial burdens, and creates an unsustainable reliance on
state Medicaid programs. Public insurance solutions alone are not
feasible given increasing needs for LTSS, limitations of state budgets,
benefit and qualifying criteria restrictions under Medicaid, and current
policy proposals to reduce Medicaid funding. Despite these inherent
problems, proposed solutions to finance LTSS have prioritized public
and social insurance models while largely underestimating the role of
private market tools. A viable solution requires a balanced approach
that integrates a thriving private LTC insurance market while
improving public options. This article proposes amending state
legislation to initiate a remodeling of LTC insurance products to
support a thriving private LTC insurance market capable of mitigating
LTSS financial burdens.
LTSS assist individuals with functional impairments that interfere
with daily activities due to illness or disability.1 Among the twelve
million individuals whom rely on LTSS, 6.7 million are over sixty-five
years old.2 Policy makers and scholars have long recognized that an
aging society will dramatically increase the burden on LTSS systems.3

1.

LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO LONG-TERM
SERVICES AND SUPPORTS (2013).

2.

Id at 3.

3.

Id.
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In 2013, the Commission on Long-term Care made an unequivocal call
to action:
“Now is the time to put these new approaches and efforts in place
if the coming generations of Americans are to have access to the array
of LTSS needed . . . the need is great. The time to act is now.”4
Financing LTSS has been an elusive challenge that permeates
solutions to improve access to and quality of LTSS. No prior proposed
solutions to this challenge have systematically examined LTC insurance
as a mechanism to resolve LTSS financing challenges. The current LTC
insurance market model is plagued with high premiums, low purchase
rates, high rates of medical denials, and low profitability for insurers.
Yet, these are symptoms of deeper issues that stem from state
regulation of LTC insurance and are the root cause of market
challenges. This article will systematically address three questions:
1) What is currently causing the private LTC insurance
market to fail?
2) What is the mechanism for fixing these causes and
implementing change?
3) What are the points of intervention that could spur a
thriving LTC insurance market?
This article argues that current state legislation has led to
unproductive underwriting practices, overly restrictive LTC insurance
policy benefits and external incentives, and restricted profitability to
create a sustainable market. As the mechanism for resolving market
failures, this article proposes using the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Long-term Care Insurance Model Act
and Regulation as catalysts to trigger broad adoption of amendments
of key state legislation. This proposal capitalizes on the NAIC’s prior
success to inform state law using model acts. The proposal targets three
points of intervention: underwriting standards that impede access to
LTC insurance policies; poorly designed benefit restrictions and
external incentives that fail to motivate LTC insurance purchase by
key populations; and failing to establish protective mechanisms to
support LTC insurers. Addressing these failures through state
legislation will increase purchase rates, leading to lower premiums, and
create a thriving LTC insurance market – thus saving the LTC
insurance market from its “death spiral.”
This article provides an initial background to the current structure
of LTSS, insurance, and regulation in Section II. Section III details the
flaws in the current LTC insurance market, primarily focusing on the
4.

Id at 6.
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cause and effect of poor purchase rates and market failure. Section IV
will provide an overview of solutions to LTSS financing that were
previously proposed. Section V will outline a proposal to amend model
law to spur market reform as a last hope to saving private LTC
insurance and financing LTSS.

I. Long-term Care Services and Supports, Insurance,
and Regulation
A.

Long-term Care Services and Supports

Long-term care services and supports (LTSS) are non-medical
services to assist with activities of daily living (ADLs) and instrumental
activities of daily living (IADLs).5 ADLs include bathing, dressing,
eating, transferring, and walking.6 Comparatively, IADLs include meal
preparation, money management, house cleaning, medication
management, and transportation.7 LTSS include assistance at a range
of levels depending on the individual’s needs, including part-time at
home care, adult day care, and skilled nursing facilities.8
Approximately twelve million Americans rely on paid LTSS.9 On
average, sixty-nine percent of LTSS users will use some type of LTSS
for a period of three years.10 Among individuals who rely on LTSS,
seven million individuals (sixty percent) are older than sixty-five years
old.11 The estimated number of older adults with severe LTSS needs is
expected to “increase by 140 percent between 2015 and 2055,”12 in part
due to the aging “baby boomer” generation. Increased needs for LTSS
are matched by an increase in age related illnesses, including
5.

Glossary, LONG TERM CARE, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV.,
https://longtermcare.acl.gov/the-basics/glossary.html (last updated Oct.
10, 2017).

6.

Id.

7.

Id.

8.

See e.g. James D. Holt, Navigating Long-Term Care, 3 GERONTOLOGY &
GERIATRIC MED. 1, 1-4 (2017).

9.

Vivian Nguyen, Long-Term Support and Services, AARP (Mar. 2017),
https://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/ppi/201701/Fact%20Sheet%2
0Long-Term%20Support%20and%20Services.pdf.

10.

AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS: LONG-TERM FINANCING
(2014).

11.

Summary
of
Commission’s
Findings,
CAPITAL
RETENTION,
https://capitalretention.com/commissionsfindings/ (last visited Nov. 18,
2018).

12.

Melissa M. Favreault et al., Financing Long-term Services and Supports:
Option Reflect Trade-Offs for Older Americans and Federal Spending, 34
HEALTH AFFAIRS 2181, 2181 (2015).
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Alzheimer’s disease and dementias.13 Age associated illnesses, such
arthritis, heart conditions, and diabetes, are the primary causes for
physical functional impairment associated with LTSS use in adults over
sixty-five.14 Among those turning sixty-five, seventy percent will need
LTSS within their lifetime and twenty percent will need LTSS for more
than five years.15 While eighty-two percent of elderly receive LTSS in
the community,16 advancing age increases the likelihood that an
individual will receive care within an institutional setting.17
Since 2011, nearly 10,000 baby boomers turn sixty-five every day.18
Baby boomers’ health and social histories are unique from preceding
generations. Baby boomers’ self-reported health assessments show lower
scores than previous generations.19 Socially, baby boomers are more
likely to value individualism, have higher incomes, are less likely to be
married, and have fewer children but more siblings.20 While two out of
three baby boomers report that they expect to need LTSS, nearly onethird do not have plans for how to pay for services.21
The cost of LTSS varies according to the individual’s functional
needs, service preferences, care setting, and geographic locations. The
average cost of a private room in a skilled nursing facility is
approximately $92,000 per year, compared to $44,000 per year for an
assisted living facility.22 Institutional care makes up sixty-two percent
of LTSS costs, the remaining costs are those provided in the community
(e.g., at home nursing care), which average $20 per hour ($800 for a

13.

LONG-TERM CARE COMMISSION, supra note 1; ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N,
ALZHEIMER’S FACTS AND FIGURES REPORT (2017).

14.

LONG-TERM CARE COMMISSION, supra note 1.

15.

AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 10.

16.

CONG. BUDGET OFF., RISKING DEMAND FOR LONG-TERM SERVICES
SUPPORTS FOR ELDERLY PEOPLE, at 20 (2013).

17.

Approximately 13% of elderly over the age of 85 receive LTSS in
institutional settings, compare to less than 2% of adults between 65-74
years old. See id. at 21.

18.

Julie Robison et al., Long-Term Supports and Services Planning for the
Future: Implications from a Statewide Survey of Baby Boomers and Older
Adults, 54 GERONTOLOGIST 297, 299 (2014).

19.

Id.

20.

Id. at 299.

21.

Id. at 304-305.

22.

Wendy Fox-Grage, Medicaid: A Last Resort for People Needing LongTerm Services and Supports, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. (Mar. 2017),
https://www.aarp.org/ppi/info-2017/medicaid-a-last-resort-for-peopleneeding-long-term-services-and-supports.html.
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forty hour work week).23 On average, individuals who require LTSS do
not have a sufficient income to cover the costs of LTSS for themselves
or a loved one.24 Nursing home care costs are equivalent to 225% of the
median income for individuals over sixty-five years old.25
Total LTSS costs in the United States were $219.9 billion in 2012,
approximately 9.3% of all personal health care spending.26 LTSS prices
are expected to increase; between 2002 and 2012 price increases ranged
between 1.6% (home health aide) to 5.1% (assisted living) a year.27 A
majority of these costs are covered by Medicaid (sixty-two percent).28
Among private sources, out-of-pocket spending (seventeen percent) is
most common;29 LTC insurers pay for twelve percent of LTSS
expenses.30
Family members and informal (non-paid) caregivers serve a critical
role in the larger LTSS system. Informal caregivers are responsible for
up to fifty-five percent of LTSS provided to the elderly.31 In 2009, the
monetary value of informal care was $450 billion.32 Informal care allows
individuals to remain in their community longer and reduces direct
LTSS expenses.33 While many informal caregivers do so because they
prefer to be the one providing care to a loved one, a lack of access due
to high expenses associated with LTSS is also a driving factor for the
high rates of informal caregivers.34 Caregivers absorb costs and risks
associated with providing care, including caregiver burden and
opportunity costs (e.g., loss of employment and interruption of care for
other dependents).35 The reliance on informal caregivers is becoming

23.

NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y FORUM, NATIONAL SPENDING FOR LONG-TERM
SERVICES AND SUPPORTS (LTSS), 2012 (2014); PAMELA DOTY & SAMUEL
SHIPLEY, DEPT. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. OFFICE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR PLAN. AND EVALUATION, LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE 1 (2012).

24.

Fox-Grage, supra note 22.

25.

Id.

26.

NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y FORUM, supra note 23.

27.

CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 16, at 24.

28.

Id. at 25.

29.

LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note 1.

30.

CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 16, at 28.

31.

Id. at 31.

32.

LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 14.

33.

Allison K. Hoffman, The Reverberating Risk of Long-Term Care, 15 YALE
J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 57, 60 (2015).

34.

LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 4.

35.

Allison K. Hoffman, Reimagining the Risk of Long-Term Care, 16 YALE
J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 147, 153-154 (2016).
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“increasingly untenable” given an aging society.36 The aging of the baby
boomer generation will dramatically influence the number of available
caregivers. The number of potential informal caregivers for each older
adult will decrease from seven to less than three between 2015 and
2050.37
B.

LTSS Financing: Medicaid and LTC Insurance

Individuals and families are unlikely to have sufficient income or
savings to fully cover LTSS out-of-pocket.38 As described below, a
minority of people own an LTC insurance policy.39 The broadly
accepted misperception that health insurance and Medicare cover LTSS
expenses prevents individual and familial preparation.40 This
misunderstanding is highlighted in data reporting that individuals are
misinformed regarding costs of LTSS and available insurers and payors
that provide LTSS coverage.41 This section will provide an introduction
on LTC insurance and Medicaid as the primary payor of LTSS.
1.

Private Long-term Care Insurance

LTC insurance policies emerged in the market over thirty years
ago, initially as “nursing home insurance” providing benefits to offset
the cost of skilled nursing facilities.42 In the 1990s, insurers began selling
comprehensive policies to cover institutional and community based
care.43 By 2015, a majority of policies offered broader benefits including
home care, with less than one percent of policies only covering nursing

36.

Id.

37.

Shana Siegel & Neil T. Rimsky, Where Do We Go From Here? LongTerm Care in the Age of the Baby Boomers, 11 NAT’L ACAD. ELDER L.
ATT’Y J. 49, 52 (2015).

38.

LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note 1 at 6.

39.

Id. at 3.

40.

Id. at 13; Erica L. Reaves & MaryBeth Musumeci, Medicaid and LongTerm Services and Supports: A Primer, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.
(Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/report/medicaid-andlong-term-services-and-supports-a-primer/; PAUL A. WERTSCH, COUNCIL
ON MED. SERV., FINANCING OF LONG-TERM SERVICES AND SUPPORTS 1
(2018).

41.

Galina Kahtutsky et al., What Do People Know About Long Term
Services and Supports?, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. (Sept. 1,
2016),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/what-do-people-know-aboutlong-term-services-and-supports.

42.

ERIC C. NORDMAN, THE STATE OF LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE: THE
MARKET, CHALLENGES AND FUTURE INNOVATIONS, NAT’L ASS’N INS.
COMMISSIONERS 2 (2016).

43.

Id. at 7.
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home care.44 The LTC insurance market is largely an individual private
market, in comparison to health insurance which relies on group and
employer policies.45 Group policies were initially introduced into the
LTC insurance market in 1987.46 Only twenty percent of employers with
more than ten employees (.5% of all employers) offer LTC insurance.47
LTC insurance is unique among its counterparts, adopting
characteristics of health, life, and disability insurance.48 Life insurance
provides coverage for a definitive loss (death) that occurs with
predictable benefits, determined by the amount selected by the
policyholder.49 Public and private health insurance cover losses that are
highly likely to occur in an acute setting with services provided by
trained professionals (i.e., physicians, nurses) within specialized settings
(i.e., hospitals, medical centers).50 Finally, disability insurance provides
coverage for an uncertain event with established benefits and a limited
end-point according to the individual’s age (most policies end coverage
once a policyholder is sixty-five years old).51 Private LTC insurance
adopts the benefit trigger model used in disability insurance, the benefit
features of health insurance, and the premium structure implemented
in life insurance.52
Approximately 7.2 million LTC insurance policies were in force in
2014.53 As it is currently designed, LTC insurance is a product for the
upper class and well educated. Individuals who purchase policies are
more likely to be college-educated (sixty-eight percent of purchasers),

44.

Id. at 18.

45.

Jeffrey R. Brown & Amy Finkelstein, The Private Market for Long-Term
Care Insurance in the United States: A Review of the Evidence, 76 J. RISK
& INS. 5, 10 (2009).

46.

Id.

47.

NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 9.

48.

Kenneth S. Abraham, Note, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 UNIV.
PA. L. REV. 653, 686 (2013).

49.

Lawrence A. Frolik, Private Long-Term Care Insurance: Not the Solution
to the High Cost of Long-Term Care for the Elderly, 23 ELDER L.J. 371,
376 (2016).

50.

See generally LOUIS C. GAPENSKI, UNDERSTANDING HEALTHCARE
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 42-44 (4th ed. 2007).

51.

Do Disability Benefits End at Age 65?, DISABILITY BENEFITS CTR.,
https://www.disabilitybenefitscenter.org/faq/do-disability-benefits-endat-age-65 (last visited Jan. 4, 2019).

52.

DOTY & SHIPLEY, supra note 23, at 4.

53.

NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 8.
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employed (sixty-eight percent of purchasers),54 and have relatives who
have experienced LTSS needs.55 The average age of purchasers is fiftyeight years old.56 Individuals with higher incomes are more likely to
have LTC insurance than others.57 Approximately nineteen percent of
adults over fifty-five years old with annual incomes over $100,000 have
LTC insurance policies, while only around nine percent of individuals
with incomes between $20,000 to $50,000 have LTC policies.58 Similarly,
the average income of purchasers has increased from $27,000 in 1990 to
$87,500 in 2010; this increase was also matched in average assets owned
by the purchaser.59
Individuals with LTC insurance policies receive more hours of paid
LTSS than un-insured counterparts.60 Caregivers of individuals with
LTC insurance provide different types of care as compared to their
counterparts of individuals without LTC insurance, shifting care
provided from hands-on intensive care to companion care.61 This has
the effect of greatly reducing caregiver burden and restoring familial
relationships.62 Average monthly savings for an individual with a policy
using LTSS range between $3000 to $5000.63 For individuals living in a
nursing home, the average monthly savings are $4838.64 The average
purchaser, who enrolls at age sixty-five, pays approximately $52,000 in
premiums and can be entitled to nearly $550,000 in maximum benefits
at the age of eighty-two.65 Despite reducing unmet needs and providing
monthly savings, LTC insurance policies still leave coverage gaps for
individuals’ LTSS needs.66

54.

Id. at 20; WHO BUYS LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE? TWENTY-FIVE YEARS
STUDY OF BUYERS AND NON-BUYERS IN 2015-2016, LIFEPLANS 15 (Jan.
2017).

OF

55.

DOTY & SHIPLEY, supra note 23, at 4.

56.

NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 53.

57.

DOTY & SHIPLEY, supra note 23, at 4.

58.

Id.

59.

NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 20.

60.

Id. at 24.

61.

Id. at 25.

62.

Id. at 42.

63.

Id. at 23.

64.

Id.

65.

Id. at 36.

66.

Kali S. Thomas & Robert Applebaum, Long-Term Services and Supports
(LTSS): A Growing Challenge for an Aging America, 25
GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. OF AMERICA 56, 57 (2015).
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2.

Medicaid LTSS Coverage

Medicaid is a federal and state run program that provides health
care benefits to individuals who meet means based eligibility
requirements.67 Medicaid is the largest payor for health care and LTSS
in the United States providing coverage for nearly seventy-three million
individuals.68 In 2013, over seventeen million individuals with
disabilities and adults over sixty-five years old (5.5% of the total
population) relied on Medicaid.69 Approximately forty percent of these
individuals were over the age of sixty-five.70 Medicaid, the primary
source for financing LTSS in the United States, pays for over sixty
percent of all LTSS expenses.71 In 2016, state and federal Medicaid
expenditures for LTSS equaled nearly $167 billion, an increase from
$159 billion in 2015.72 LTSS’ reliance on Medicaid cost federal and state
Medicaid programs nearly $152 billion in 2014.73
Medicaid eligibility criteria require individuals to demonstrate that
their income and assets meet the “means test.”74 This means that the
individual has less than a set amount in assets (usually less than
$2000).75 An individual or family may “spend down” their assets to
meet these requirements, by using up any assets that are over the
threshold amount. Approximately ten percent of adults over fifty
“spend down”76 resources to qualify for Medicaid to access services.77
Nearly forty percent of individuals who “spend down” to meet Medicaid
eligibility requirements are in the middle class.78 The 2005 Deficit
Reduction Act created additional restrictions in order to close loopholes

67.

Medicaid Eligibility, MEDICAID, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/
eligibility/index.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2018).

68.

Id.

69.

Fox-Grage, supra note 22.

70.

Id.

71.

CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 16.

72.

Steve Eiken et al., Medicaid Expenditures for Long-Term Services and
Supports in FY 2016, MEDICAID INNOVATION ACCELERATOR PROGRAM
(May
2018),
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/ltss/downloads/
reports-and-evaluations/ltssexpenditures2016.pdf.

73.

Fox-Grage, supra note 22.

74.

Id.

75.

Id.

76.

Spending Down Assets to Qualify for Medicaid, ELDER LAW ANSWERS
(Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.elderlawanswers.com/spending-down-assetsto-qualify-for-medicaid-12003.

77.

Fox-Grage, supra note 22.

78.

Id.
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in meeting the means test, including prohibiting individuals to transfer
assets to family members or set up trusts.79 During the spend down
period individuals must cover costs of LTSS until they meet eligibility
requirements.80
Medicaid coverage is incomplete in two aspects. First, the coverage
provided under Medicaid limits access to services that are provided
under state plans.81 State Medicaid plans must include nursing home
care, but other services are optional.82 Reimbursement rates for
Medicaid programs are typically set between ten and thirty percent
below private pay rates for nursing homes.83 State plans may place
limits on community-based programs.84 Enrollment caps for
community-based services lead to waitlists and substandard care.85
Additionally, Medicaid programs may exclude some disabling
conditions or prohibit assistance with some daily activities.86 Second,
individuals may go without access to appropriate care while working to
meet the means tests to qualify. The reliance on Medicaid to provide
financing for LTSS adds an upwards of 10,000 individuals per day
without access to paid LTSS.87
Medicaid programs have a direct impact on LTC insurance
purchase rates due to a “crowd out effect.”88 Data demonstrates that
the availability of Medicaid as a safety net reduces individual
willingness to pay for long-term care insurance for all but the wealthiest
individuals.89 Data from a 2007 study demonstrates that the broad
79.

DOTY & SHIPLEY, supra note 23, at 4.

80.

NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 145.

81.

LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note, 1 at 14.

82.

Id.

83.

Daniel Barczyk & Matthias Kredler, Evaluating Long-Term-Care Policy
Options, Taking the Family Seriously, 85 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 766, 770
(2017).

84.

LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note, 1 at 3.

85.

Judy Feder, The Challenges of Financing Long-term Care, 8 ST. LOUIS U.
J. HEALTH L. POL’Y 47, 55 (2014).

86.

See Hoffman, supra note 35, at 170.

87.

NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 33.

88.

Jeffrey R. Brown & Amy Finkelstein, The Interaction of Public and
Private Insurance: Medicaid and the Long-Term Care Insurance Market,
98 AM. ECON. REV. 1083, 1091-92 (2008). “Crowd out” is commonly
referred to as the phenomenon that occurs, where, as a result of Medicaid
as an option to pay for LTSS, individuals – particularly those in the
middle class – are less like to purchase LTC insurance. Instead, individuals
assume that when services are needed, they will be able to rely on
Medicaid. See Frolik, supra note 49, at 377-79.

89.

Id. at 1092-1093.
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availability of Medicaid leads to an unwillingness to purchase an LTC
insurance policy.90 This study found that even when other market
failures were resolved to provide an actuarially fair and comprehensive
LTC insurance policy that individuals were unwilling to pay for
insurance.91 Populations in the sixtieth percentile of wealth in men and
seventieth percentile of wealth in women were the only reported
exceptions to unwillingness to purchase LTC insurance when Medicaid
is available.92 Without solutions to incentivize purchase rates of LTC
insurance in non-wealthy populations, the rising demands on LTSS and
reliance on Medicaid will place fiscal pressure on state and federal
budgets.93 In 2003, a National Governors Association report indicated
that states paid as much in LTSS costs as K-12 education.94 This
financial pressure will squeeze out budgets for other priorities,
particularly with looming pressure to “trim” Medicaid at the federal
level.95
C.

Regulation of Long-term Care Insurance

LTC insurance is regulated primarily through state law, with
minimal federal legislative or regulatory influence.96 Federal law
establishes a bare-bone foundation for (1) minimum coverage provided
by long-term care policies, and (2) generally defining long-term care
policies.97 Federal law does not, however, regulate LTC insurance
underwriting or coverage practices.98 Additionally, LTC insurance is not
subject to major federal anti-discrimination laws including the

90.

Id. at 1093.

91.

Id. at 1092-1093.

92.

Id. at 1093.

93.

Brown & Finkelstein, supra note 45, at 2.

94.

Id.

95.

Id.

96.

Jalayne J. Arias et al., The Proactive Patient: Long-term Care Insurance
Discrimination Risks of Alzheimer’s Disease Biomarkers, 46 J. OF L. MED.
& ETHICS 485, 485 (2018).

97.

Treatment of Qualified Long-Term Care Insurance, 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 7702(B)(c)(1) (2015).

98.

See id.
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Affordable Care Act (ACA)99 and the Genetic Information NonDiscrimination Act (GINA).100 Limited federal law is consistent across
insurance types, leaving states at the helm of regulating insurance
practices.
The McCarren-Ferguson Act delegates the regulation of insurance
to states.101 States have broad discretion to establish standards for
insurers through legislation and regulation.102 Typically, this includes
legislation and regulations, as well as oversight provided by the
Insurance Commissioner.103 An insurance commissioner may have
different powers in individual states, but they are generally charged
with leading the state’s Department of Insurance and overseeing
insurance regulation.104 This has led to varying approaches for standards
and practices across states.105 These variations create barriers to broad
and effective solutions at a national level.

II. Broken Long-term Care Insurance Market
LTC insurance is a failing market. Scholars, policymakers, and the
media have regularly recognized the challenges burdening the market.106
Prior criticisms of the market have focused on poor purchase rates and

99.

Long-Term Care Insurance Tax-Deductibility Rules – LTC Tax Rules,
AM. ASS’N FOR LONG-TERM CARE INS., http://www.aaltci.org/long-termcare-insurance/learning-center/tax-for-business.php (last visited Nov. 18,
2018); The ACA prohibits health insurers from discriminating against an
individual based on a preexisting condition for underwriting decisions.
Prohibition of Preexisting Condition Exclusions, 45 C.F.R § 147.108
(2015).
The ACA prohibits health insurers from discriminating against an
individual based on a preexisting condition for underwriting decisions.
Prohibition of Preexisting Condition Exclusions, 45 § 147.108.

100. GINA prohibits employers and health insurers from using genetic
information, including family history, to discriminate against individuals.
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122
Stat. 881 (2008).
101. McCarren Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1012 (1945).
102. Id.
103. See About the Department, CAL. DEP’T INS., https://www.insurance.ca.
gov/0500-about-us/02-department/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2018).
104. About the NAIC, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONER,
www.naic.org/index_about.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2018).

https://

105. Arias et al., supra note 97.
106. Frolik, supra note 49, at 414; Howard Gleckman, The Traditional LongTerm Care Insurance Market Crumbles, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardgleckman/2017/09/08/thetraditional-long-term-care-insurance-market-crumbles/#71eddbf63ec3.
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limited policy values for individual purchasers.107 This section will
highlight data to evaluate the causes and effects of essential flaws in
the LTC insurance market, including poor purchase rates and market
failures.
A.

Poor Purchase Rates

Among adults between the ages of sixty and sixty-five, only ten
percent hold LTC insurance policies.108 Only 89,000 individuals
purchased new LTC insurance policies in 2016, almost a fourteen
percent drop from the number purchased in 2015.109 Declining insurance
purchase rates have been attributed to multiple factors, including
underwriting practices, insufficient benefit and incentive structures, and
high premiums.
1.

Underwriting Standards

Underwriting is the collection of individual information to evaluate
an applicant’s risk for future benefit claims to determine eligibility and
premium rates.110 Standard underwriting practices rely on collecting and
evaluating an applicant’s “past and current use of health services,
medical conditions, lifestyle, and limitations in physical and medical
functioning.”111 While underwriting may lead to denials and
prohibitively high premium rates, it also is critical for insurance market
stability.112 Underwriting guards against adverse selection and protects
insurers against profit losses resulting from actual claims exceeding
projected or expected claims.113
State law and regulation provides significant discretion to LTC
insurers in the context of underwriting practices.114 Unlike health
insurers, LTC insurers are broadly permitted to collect and use health
information for underwriting decisions.115 Individuals with past medical
histories may be denied a policy or face increased and prohibitively high

107. Gleckman, supra note 107.
108. Portia Y. Cornell et al., Medical Underwriting in Long-Term Care
Insurance: Market Conditions Limit Options for Higher-Risk Consumers,
35 HEALTH AFF. 1494, 1495 (2016).
109. Gleckman, supra note 107.
110. Helena Temkin-Greener et al., Long-term Care Insurance Underwriting:
Understanding Eventual Claims Experience, 37 INQUIRY 348, 349 (2000).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 356-357.
113. Id. at 349.
114. Arias et al., supra note 97, at 485.
115. See id. at 488.
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premiums.116 Explicit legislative and regulatory provisions permitting
medical underwriting117 exacerbate consequences of current practices.
Insurers’ underwriting practices are proprietary information and are
not easily accessible. However, publicly available guidance documents
for purchasers and underwriters may provide insight on standards used
by a specific company. For example, underwriter guides issued by
insurers recommend careful observation for evidence of disability
obtained through in-person observation and tailored interview
questions to elicit risk for a collection of named conditions.118 Guides
also provide lists of uninsurable conditions, commonly known as
“knock-out” conditions. These conditions include AIDS, Alzheimer’s
disease, uncontrolled depression, diabetes (if outside weight
parameters), and some organ transplants.119 When a knock-out
condition does not immediately disqualify an individual from LTC
insurance, other risk factors may lead to varying rates based on
“preferred” or risk status.120
Approximately twenty-four percent of individuals who apply for
LTC insurance are denied a policy due to medical underwriting.121
Individuals who are in the target population for LTC insurance
(between the ages of sixty and seventy-one), are likely to experience
higher rates of denial (up to forty percent).122 Several factors are most
influential in determining eligibility, including age and medical history
of diabetes or stroke.123 When controlled for other factors, “each tenyear increase in age significantly decreased approval probability.”124
Among applicants over eighty years old, forty-four percent are denied
coverage, compared to less than seven percent of those under forty-five
years old.125 A medical history of diabetes and stroke were the most
116. See id. at 486.
117. See e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-1406 (2011).
118. Long Term Care Insurance Underwriting Guide, GENWORTH FIN., at ii
(2007),
http://www.resourcebrokerage.com/pdfs/ltci/underwriting/
genworth.pdf.
119. Id. at vi; See Underwriting Guidelines for the Enhanced Care Benefit
Rider and Long Term Care Acceleration of Death Benefit Rider,
METLIFE, https://croweandassociates.com/wp- content/uploads/2016/
07/FIX_ECB_UW_Flyer.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2018).
120. GENWORTH FIN., supra note 119, at iv; Temkin-Greener et al., supra note
111, at 351.
121. Cornell et al., supra note 109, at 1495-1496.
122. Id. at 1500.
123. Id. at 1498.
124. Id.
125. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV., LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE
RESEARCH BRIEF 6 (2012).
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influential in adversely affecting approval ratings in comparison to
history of other chronic diseases.126 Individuals who are extremely obese
or underweight had similar rates of denial.127 Lastly, recent data
demonstrates that parental medical history may now also influence
underwriting practices, particularly when considering premium rates.128
The denial rates-based health information provides no evidence on
the accuracy of actuarial practices. At least one study has shown that
underwriting practices, including the use of knock-out conditions, does
not accurately predict high users of LTSS who would be “high risk”
policy holders.129 A simulation of underwriting practices demonstrated
that individuals who would be rejected from policies were not
consistently likely to have higher uses of LTSS.130 Inaccurate
underwriting practices impede access to LTC insurance without
appropriate justification and unnecessarily narrow the population of
potential purchasers.
Adverse decisions based on health information may appear
discriminatory. However, discriminatory behavior is consistent with risk
classification practices that are broadly accepted under the guise of
efficiency.131 Risk classification practices provide insurers with
information to determine eligibility and premiums that are consistent
with an individual’s risk for loss covered under the relevant policy.132
Insurers use individual information to identify risk of loss for
underwriting practices protects the insurer and its pool of insured. At
the federal level, across insurance types, only four statutes and one
regulation have placed limits on insurers’ use of individual information
in underwriting.133 None of these federal laws extend protections to LTC
insurance.134

126. Cornell et al., supra note 109, at 1496.
127. Id.
128. Juliette Fairley, Parental Medical History Now Influencing the Cost of
Long-term Care Premiums, FIN. ADVISOR (Sept. 12, 2014),
https://www.fa-mag.com/news/parental-medical-history-nowinfluencing-the-cost-of-long-term-care-premiums-19134.html.
129. Temkin-Greener et al., supra note 111, at 355.
130. Id., at 356.
131. Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination
Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 195, 197 (2014).
132. Id. at 204; GEORGES DIONNE & CASEY G. ROTHSCHILD, CIRRELT, RISK
CLASSIFICATION AND HEALTH INSURANCE 1 (2011).
133. Avraham et al., supra note 132, at 199.
134. AMERICAN ASS’N FOR LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE, supra note 100.
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2.

Policy Benefits and External Incentives

Insufficient policy benefits and external incentives have limited the
perceived value of LTC insurance policies to potential purchasers.135
Benefit triggers serve as an additional barrier to claiming benefits for
LTSS. Most LTC insurance policies do not cover all costs incurred by
LTSS users due to benefit limits and elimination periods.136 As a result,
individuals and families remain responsible for some out-of-pocket
expenses associated with LTSS.137 This, in combination with a lack of
insufficient external incentives (e.g., tax incentives), limits the appeal
of LTC insurance, particularly those who have other financial priorities
that take the place of monthly premiums.138
a.

Benefits

Individuals with policies are not free from financial responsibility
for LTSS. Benefit triggers, elimination periods, and benefit caps limit
the portion of LTSS expenses covered and protect insurers from
excessive losses due to claims.139 These policy mechanisms reduce the
benefits available to policy holders, adversely impacting the value of
the policy to a potential purchaser.
“Benefit triggers” are qualification criteria a policyholder must
meet to make a claim for LTSS benefits under an LTC insurance
policy.140 Benefit triggers are met when an individual has impairment
that interferes with managing ADLs as determined by a licensed
professional (i.e., physician, nurse, social worker).141 In the case of
cognitive impairment, supervision and verbal cueing are sufficient to
meet benefit triggers.142 If a policy is “tax qualified,” benefits are
triggered when a policy holder is unable to perform at least two ADLs
for a period of at least 90 days.143 Insurers are prohibited from
conditioning eligibility of benefits on prior hospitalization or other “high
level” institutional care.144 Insurers are required to disclose benefit
135. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, CHOOSING LONGTERM CARE INSURANCE POLICIES: WHAT DO PEOPLE WANT 8 (2016).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 393-94.
140. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL
REGULATION (2017).
141. Id. at §§ 29-30.
142. Id. at §§ 29(D)(2).
143. Id. at § 30.
144. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL ACT
§ 6(D)(1)(b) (2017).
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triggers for policy holders.145 Benefit triggers create a barrier by which
insurers can decline coverage. A lack of trust in insurers and anecdotal
evidence of unjustified adverse coverage decisions may discourage
individuals from purchasing LTC insurance.146
Most policies do not provide coverage immediately upon meeting
criteria for benefit triggers.147 Elimination periods, also referred to as
deductibles or waiting periods, require that an individual has
experienced impairment for a specified number of days before coverage
is provided.148 Elimination periods are on average ninety-three days,149
but range from twenty to 100 service or calendar days.150 As a result,
even individuals who have invest in LTC insurance will need to rely on
out-of-pocket payments for LTSS until they meet the elimination period
requirements.
Benefit limits establish thresholds for costs covered daily, annually,
and within a lifetime. Most LTC insurance policies place caps on the
costs covered, which will not meet the full cost of care.151 In 2015, the
average daily benefit limits were $159 for nursing home care and $152
for home care.152 Additionally, insurers are unlikely to sell policies
without a benefit duration cap, averaging four years, to avoid liability
for an unlimited period.153 This has been a change in policy design since
the 1990s. In 1990, thirty-three percent of policies offered lifetime
benefits and, in 2015, this declined to eleven percent.154 Benefit duration
caps are inconsistent with data demonstrating that twenty percent of
LTSS users will need services for more than five years and another
twenty percent will need services for between two and five years.155
Similar to elimination periods, the use of benefit limits can discourage

145. Id. at § 6(G)(2)(b).
146. Frolick, supra note 49, at 385, 393.
147. Id.
148. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL
REGULATION §§ 29-30.
149. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 18.
150. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS, A SHOPPER’S GUIDE
CARE INSURANCE 23 (2013).

TO

LONG-TERM

151. Id.; Health Insurance Caps Leave Patients Stranded, NBC NEWS,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/25644309/ns/health-health_care/t/healthinsurance-caps-leave-patients-stranded/#.W93E_hNKiu4 (last updated
July 13, 2008).
152. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 18.
153. LIFEPLANS, supra note 54, at 22.
154. Id. at 23.
155. LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note, 1 at 3.
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potential purchasers, given the continued need for out-of-pocket
payment for expenses.
b.

External Incentives

External incentives, including tax benefits, can be beneficial to
offset the costs associated with purchasing an LTC insurance policy.
However, tax incentives have yet to motivate purchase rates in the
middle class.156 Current federal policies permit individuals to include
premiums for tax-qualified policies as part of medical expense tax
deductions.157 An individual can deduct medical expenses that are
greater than 7.5% of their income in 2017 and 2018.158 Beginning in
2019, deductions will only be available for medical expenses that exceed
ten percent of an individual’s income.159 In addition to federal tax
incentives, twenty-four states offer tax incentives that reduce the
average tax premium costs by an average of five percent.160
Additionally, individuals who purchase “tax-qualified” policies are
not required to report benefits as income.161 A policy is tax-qualified if
it meets regulated criteria, including: (1) the policy only provides
coverage for LTSS; (2) the policy is guaranteed renewable; (3) the
benefits are triggered by impairment interfering with two ADLs; (4) the
policy has requirements that chronic illness or disability continues for
at least ninety days; and (5) the policy’s benefits are triggered by
cognitive impairment only when the impairment requires “substantial
supervision.”162 Additionally, tax-qualified policies must include
inflation protection, dramatically increasing the cost of premiums.163
This incentive does not help offset premium costs for the years before
an individual claims their benefits. As a result, this benefit may increase
adverse selection by not encouraging individuals to purchase a policy
prior to identifying a potential need for LTSS. Insurers also cite
156. Id.
157. Dena Bunis, How You Can Deduct Your Medical Expenses, AARP (Jan.
12,
2018),
https://www.aarp.org/money/taxes/info-2018/medicaldeductions-irs-fd.html.
158. AGI Threshold for Medical Expenses Restored to 7.5%, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/agi-threshold-for-medical-expensesrestored-to-75 (last updated Feb. 9, 2018).
159. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 Pub. L. No. 115-97 (2017).
160. DOTY & SHIPLEY, supra note 23, at 8.
161. Do I Have to Report Benefits From a Long-Term Care Insurance Policy
to the IRS?, MCCANN INS. SERV., https://mccannltc.net/resources/
faq/reporting-benefits-to-the-irs (last visited Nov. 18, 2018).
162. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL ACT
§ 30.
163. Id. at § 13.
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requirements to meet the criteria as impediments to innovative product
design.164
3.

High Premiums

High premiums are simultaneously a cause and effect of low
purchase rates. The average annual policy premium was $2772 in
2015.165 Premium rates vary depending on individual risk profiles and
the benefits selected by the policy holder.166 Once a risk profile is
determined through underwriting, an insurer will make an eligibility
determination and offer the policy to accepted candidates based on
specified premium rates.167 Some insurers will assign the individual to a
rate class.168 For example, an individual who is high risk may be
assigned to a “lower preference” category that assigns higher
premiums.169 Premiums rates will also differ based on an individual’s
benefit elections (i.e., length of coverage, benefit limits, covered
services).170 For example, an individual’s age at the time of enrollment
and selecting inflation protection can dramatically influence a
premium.171 An enrollee who purchases a policy at age fifty for $200
daily benefits for four years of coverage will pay an average of $4349 in
an annual premium with inflation protection.172 Without inflation
protection, the annual would be $1294. The same policy would be
$13,500 and $8146 respectively for an individual who is seventy-five at
the time of enrollment.173 If an individual enrolled at fifty-five and then
sought benefits at age eight-five, the policyholder would have paid over
$81,000 in premiums, assuming that rates were not raised. In 2012,
ASPE reported that in the preceding ten years almost all LTC insurers

164. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 26.
165. Id. at 18.
166. Temkin-Greener et al., supra note 111, at 351.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 350.
169. Id. at 351.
170. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS, supra note 151.
171. How Insurance Companies Set Health Premiums, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/how-plans-set-your-premiums/ (last visited
Nov. 18, 2018).
172. Robert Powell, How to Handle Long-Term Premium Hikes, USA TODAY
(Mar. 16, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/columnist/
powell/2014/03/16/powell-long-term-care-insuranceretirement/6428373/.
173. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS, supra note 151, at 33.
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had substantially increased their rates.174 Similar data reported that
between 2010 and 2015 premiums increased by nineteen percent.175
High premium rates are a significant contributor to low purchase
rates.176 The high cost of LTC insurance narrows the pool of individuals
who would be financially suitable for purchasing an LTC insurance
policy. Only approximately forty-five percent of individuals have
sufficient incomes and assets to be financially suitable candidates for
LTC insurance.177 The most conservative recommendations indicate
than an individual is financially suitable if (1) LTC insurance premiums
would make up less than five percent of the individual’s income, and
(2) the individual has over $50,000 in assets.178 Purchasers on average
have an income of $87,500 and eighty-two percent of purchasers have
assets valued over $100,000.179 Among individuals who are financially
suitable for LTC insurance policies, only sixteen percent of those over
sixty-five and five percent of those between forty-five and sixty-five
years old have policies.180 Non-buyers specifically reference competing
demands and other priorities for finances.181 This sentiment is further
reflected in a continued decline in purchase rates in the middle class.182
B.

Market Failures

Market sustainability has been a critical flaw for LTC insurance.
The sustainability of an insurance product relies on the willingness of
individuals to pay for it.183 LTC insurance, as described above, has
struggled to incentive purchases. In the 1980s and the 1990s, the private
LTC insurance market saw a growth.184 In 2002, approximately 100
174. DOTY & SHIPLEY, supra note 23, at 5.
175. LIFEPLANS, supra note 54, at 24.
176. 55% of adults over 50 report that high costs deterred purchase. NORDMAN,
supra note 42, at 22.
177. Cornell et al., supra note 109, at 1499.
178. Id.; Long-Term Care, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS, https://
www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_long_term_care.htm (last updated
July 11, 2018).
179. LIFEPLANS, supra note 54, at 5.
180. MARC A. COHEN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV., EXITING THE
MARKET: UNDERSTANDING THE FACTORS BEHIND CARRIERS’ DECISION TO
LEAVE THE LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE MARKET 20 (2013).
181. JOSHUA M. WIENER ET AL., ASPE, FINDINGS FROM THE SURVEY OF LONGTERM CARE AWARENESS AND PLANNING 4 (2015).
182. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 138.
183. Frolik, supra note 49, at 375.
184. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 7.
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insurers were actively selling LTC insurance policies, but by 2012, this
number dropped to twelve.185 Insufficient profits are the most cited
reason for insurers’ decisions to leave the market.186 Low purchase rates
have individual and societal consequence, as well as major consequences
for the sustainability for the market based on loss of profits.
Actuarial sustainability requires that revenues (through collected
premiums) must be ample enough to meet the needs of future payouts
(claims).187 A 2016 NAIC Report on the market reported that current
earned premiums total under $12 billion, in contrast to the $28 billion
earned in group life insurance.188 Despite the decline in LTC insurance
policy purchases and premiums collected, the number of claims has
continued to increase.189 As a result, loss ratios (the difference between
the claims paid to the premiums collected) have steadily increased
reflecting data that actual claims have exceeded expected claims.190
1.

Actuarial Challenges

LTC insurance actuarial analysis faces unique challenges to
maintain sustainable loss ratios. The market has struggled to accurately
price policies and anticipate costs of claims.191 Predictors for use of
LTSS are not well described.192 As a result, collected health and personal
information to determine risk may not be sufficient for a full actuarial
analysis. Accuracy in actuarial analysis is further complicated because
of significant uncertainties unique to LTSS, including individual
preferences and the availability of informal caregivers to defer the need
for paid services. LTC insurance assumes the risk for care which is
provided in multiple settings (home or institution), LTSS is labor
intensive but does not always require highly skilled caregivers, the
period of care is unpredictable, and the potential risk of needing access
to coverage is uncertain. Adverse selection and more hazards contribute
to limitations of actuarial analysis in LTC insurance.
As a voluntary program, LTC insurers are exposed to increased
risks of adverse selection.193 Adverse selection is the use of information

185. Ami Ko, 18th Ann. Joint Meeting of the Retirement Res. Consortium,
Selection in the Long-Term Care Insurance Market (Aug. 4-5, 2016).
186. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 3.
187. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 10.
188. NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2016).
189. NORDMAN, supra note 42 at 8, 163.
190. Id. at 15 (actual claims exceed expected claims by 107%).
191. See id. at 17.
192. Temkin-Greener et al., supra note 111, at 356-357.
193. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 10.
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unknown to the other party (here, the insurer) to inform a decision.194
For purposes of LTC insurance, adverse selection refers to the
population of individuals who seek LTC insurance after learning
information that increases their risk of LTSS need in the future.195 High
rates of adverse selection increase the proportion of individuals who are
“high risk” policyholders within an insured pool.196 An insurance pool
with an increase proportion of “high risk” policyholders negatively
influences the risk loss ratio, due to an increased demand for claims,
ultimately resulting in high premiums rates.197
“Moral hazard” references the concept that an individual with
insurance protection will be more likely to use services or engage in
risky behavior, than they would without a policy.198 Moral hazard is
distinct in LTC insurance. First, individual preference is likely to inform
the type and location of care sought under an LTC insurance policy
benefit. It is feasible to think that having an LTC insurance policy
would result in utilization of more expensive care.199 Second, having a
policy increases the access to and availability of types of services, in
comparison to limited services provided under Medicaid programs.200
And finally, informal caregivers may simultaneously provide care and
serve as decision makers for the type and level of LTSS.201 Elimination
periods may serve as a counter to moral hazard risks by encouraging
policyholders and caregivers to explore less expensive services. Yet, this
does not eliminate the possibility that once coverage is available an
individual will select more expensive LTSS. Moral hazards increase the
complexity of actuarial analysis.
2.

Market Instability for Policyholders

In 2016, only seventeen insurers sold LTC insurance policies;202
another report cites that in 2012 only twelve insurers remained in the

194. Id.
195. Frolik, supra note 49, at 383-85.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 385.
198. Id. at 385.
199. Helmuth Cremer et al., The Design of Long Term Care Insurance
Contracts, 50 J. HEALTH ECON. 330, 331 (2016).
200. Richard Elsenberg, Medicare, Medicaid and Long-Term Care: Your
Questions Answered, FORBES (Nov. 21, 2017, 1:04 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2017/11/21/medicaremedicaid-and-long-term-care-your-questions-answered/#6b2a070976c9.
201. NAT’L ACAD. SCI., ENGINEERING & MED., FAMILIES CARING FOR AN AGING
AMERICA 88-89 (2016).
202. Gleckman, supra note 107.
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market.203 This is a sharp decline from the nearly 100 insurers selling
LTC insurance products in 2002.204 The declining number of insurers in
the market hinders access due to a limited supply, also increasing
premium rates. The consequences of an insurer no longer offering LTC
insurance policies or leaving the market likely informs non-purchasers’
opinions about the value and security of a potential policy. However,
purchasers are protected from losing the value of their policy in the
circumstance where an insurer “leaves” the market. An insurer may
leave the market either by suspending sales of new LTC insurance
policies or by going bankrupt.205 If an insurer suspends policies sales, no
longer selling new policies, the company must honor the individual’s
policy under Guaranteed Renewable Clauses.206 The Guaranteed
Renewable Clauses required under state law prohibit insurers from
canceling a policy.207 Therefore, in this circumstance, an individual
purchaser would still have coverage under their policy according to the
agreed terms. If an insurer goes bankrupt, the Insurance Guarantee
Pool protects the purchaser.208 In this situation, two outcomes may
arise: first, another insurer could purchase the bankrupting insurers’
assets and would be required to honor the policies purchased.209 Second,
if another insurer does not purchase the assets, the state-run Insurance
Guarantee Pool will honor the liabilities of an insurance policy up to a
specified amount.210 However, the rate of insurers leaving the market
raises concerns about the viability of private LTC insurance, as it is
currently modeled.

203. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 12.
204. Id.
205. What Happens When My Insurance Company Leaves the Market?, LTC
CONSUMER,
https://ltcconsumer.com/newsletter/what-happens-whenmy-insurance-company-leaves/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
206. Id.
207. Id.; Ed Beeson, Long-Term Care Insurance Market Shrinking as
Prudential,
Others
Pull
Back, NJ.COM (Mar. 25, 2012),
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/03/insurers_including_njs_pr
udent.html.
208. Hersh Stern, State Guaranty Associations (“SGAs”), IMMEDIATE
ANNUITIES (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.immediateannuities.com/stateguaranty-associations/.
209. Dana Anspach, What Happens If Your Insurance Company Files
Bankruptcy?, BALANCE (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/
what-happens-if-your-insurance-company-files-bankruptcy-2388607.
210. Id.
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III. Prior Solutions
Challenges associated with LTSS financing are not new and
multiple scholars and policy makers have proposed solutions. However,
none of these solutions have yet to fully address the issues plaguing the
system. New proposals must incorporate prior lessons learned to
develop feasible solutions that will influence LTSS financing. This
section will examine prior proposals, including a critical assessment of
why proposals were less successful. Proposals vary as to (1) promoting
public or private insurance solutions; (2) the beneficiary of benefits
provided under insurance (i.e., the care-recipient or “next-friend”);211
and (3) the potential use of innovative structures (i.e., hybrid
products). This section highlights some key proposals but does not
cover all solutions. International models, including those implemented
in Germany and Japan, have also been raised as models for financing
LTSS through social models.212 Because they are less feasible to
implement, models that rely on a health care system which greatly
differs from the United States’ health care system will not be reviewed
here. Instead, key details of the CLASS Act, the 2013 Report by the
Commission on Long-term Care, Partnership Programs, Hybrid
Products, and the integration of family and friends in developing
solutions will be reviewed.
A.

The CLASS Act

In 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s (ACA)
efforts to reform health care included the Community Living Assistance
Service and Supports Act (CLASS Act).213 As a final priority of Senator
Edward (Ted) Kennedy, the CLASS Act aimed to provide a federal
voluntary LTC insurance program for individuals needing LTSS.214 The
CLASS Act targeted the needs of the middle class by providing an
affordable option to enroll in LTC insurance and prepare for future
LTSS expenses.215 The CLASS Act was a controversial measure prior
to its passage, even along party lines. Just four months before the ACA
was signed into law, eleven Democrats urged Senate leadership to
remove the CLASS Act from the ACA before passage.216 Critics
211. Hoffman, supra note 35.
212. Barczyk & Kredler, supra note 84.
213. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, P. Law No. 111-148, § 8002,
124 Stat. 119 (2010).
214. Id.
215. Gardener Harris & Robert Pear, Still No Relief in Sight for Long-term
Care
Needs,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
24,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/14/health/policy/14care.html.
216. Id.
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questioned the actuarial soundness of the proposed program.217 They
argued that the bill did not have sufficient funding for marketing
necessary to promote participation and that it lacked sufficient
eligibility requirements.218 Despite these criticisms, the CLASS Act was
kept as part of the ACA and was signed into law in March 2010.219
The CLASS Act sought to establish a federal voluntary insurance
program, enrolling participants through employers who elected to
participate.220 Employees of participating employers would be
automatically enrolled unless they opted out, modeled after retirement
savings programs.221 Consistent with the group insurance model,
underwriting would not be used to determine eligibility or premiums.222
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) would be
responsible for establishing premium rates according to age of enrollees,
with nominal rates for individuals who were below the poverty line and
students.223 Enrollees in the insurance program would receive cash
benefits.224 Amounts would have been determined according to
functional need, but be no less than $50 per day without aggregate or
lifetime limits.225 Enrollees would become eligible for benefits after five
years of paying premiums if unable to perform at least two ADLs.226
Finally the CLASS Act placed significant limitations on the program’s
ability to increase premiums, including barring a raise of premiums for
individuals over sixty-five or who are no longer employed.227 The
CLASS Act relied on the Secretary of HHS to implement the program
and structure it to remain solvent over a seventy-five-year period
funded entirely through premiums.228

217. Kate Pickert, Should Long-Term-Care Insurance Be-Part of Health
Reform?, TIME (Dec. 8, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/
politics/article/0,8599,1946431,00.html.
218. Specifically, concerns were raised that work requirements were not
sufficient, by permitting those were employed seasonally to enroll. Id.
219. Id.
220. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, P. Law No. 111-148, § 8002,
124 Stat. 119 (2010).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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Shortly after the ACA’s enactment, the Secretary of HSS
determined that the CLASS Act was actuarially insolvent.229 A financial
analysis of the program determined that in the initial nine years of the
program there would be a net Federal savings of approximately $38
billion due to the five-year vesting period.230 The savings from the
program would decline beginning in 2015 as enrollees begin using
benefits.231 Projected benefits would exceed premium revenues
beginning in 2025 leading to a Federal net cost for the program long
term.232 In addition to failing to meet the CLASS Act’s requirement for
solvency over a seventy-five-year period, the program would fail to
significantly increase participation in LTC insurance.233 Approximately
two percent of potential participants (an estimated 2.8 billion) were
projected to enroll by the third year, compared to the four percent of
potential participants enrolled in private insurance through
employers.234 The estimated average premium needed to adequately
fund the program was $240 per month, given the estimated low
participation rate.235
The program’s flaws resulted from interconnected consequences of
a voluntary program, without a federal subsidy to encourage
enrollment, that lacked a mechanism to screen for high risk
participants, leading to a high risk of adverse selection.236 Adverse
selection was determined to be the nail on the actuarial coffin for this
program.237 The lack of underwriting and expected higher premiums
was would have likely deterred healthy individuals from enrolling in the
program.238 Additionally, there was no method to prevent already
disabled individuals from enrolling and seeking benefits once they have
vested.239 The program, offering $50 per day benefits, would have
229. Chris Fleming, Health Policy
18,
2011),
hblog20110518.010958/full/;
REPORT ON THE ACTUARIAL,
CLASS PROGRAM (2011).

Brief: The CLASS Act, HEALTH AFF. (May
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV., A
MARKETING, AND LEGAL ANALYSES OF THE

230. Memorandum from Richard S. Foster, Dept. Health and Human Serv.
CMS Office of the Actuary, (Apr. 22, 2010).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 15.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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difficulty competing with private LTC insurance with higher daily
benefits which would be more appealing to healthy individuals seeking
policies. As a result, those who would have most incentive to enroll
would be those who are already in need of or know they will have a
high risk for needing LTSS in the near future – a trait that would create
the “insurance death spiral.”240 Ultimately, the Administration
determined that this program could not succeed under the statutory
requirements; the CLASS Act was repealed in 2012.241
B.

Commission for Long-term Care Services and Supports

The Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (Relief Act) simultaneously
repealed the CLASS Act and created the Commission on Long-term
Care (LTC Commission).242 The Relief Act mandated that the LTC
Commission develop a “plan for the establishment, implementation,
and financing of a comprehensive, coordinated, and high-quality
system” for LTSS.243 The LTC Commission released its report to
Congress in September 2013 with recommendations on service delivery,
the workforce, and financing.244 Unlike other sections of its report, which
included specific and actionable recommendations, the LTC
Commission was unable to reach consensus on a single approach to
financing LTSS.245 The LTC Commission offered two alternate
approaches. The distinctions between the approaches reflect tensions
over what to prioritize: solutions to improve the private insurance
market or public solutions through social insurances.246 The LTC
Commission simultaneously recognized limitations of government
programs serving as the safety net given budget constraints and argued
for a more robust private insurance market and emphasized LTSS as a
social challenge requiring a societal solution.247 The proposed solutions
reflected the tension over public versus private market priorities.
1.

Commission on Long-term Care: Approach A

Approach A recommended strengthening the private market
through individual and market incentives.248 The LTC Commission
240. Id.
241. Am. Taxpayer Relief Act, P. Law No. 112-240, § 642, 126 Stat. 2313
(2012).
242. Id. at § 643.
243. Id.
244. LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note 1.
245. Id at 3.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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proposed a tax preference through retirement and health accounts by
allowing individuals to pay for LTC insurance premiums by
withdrawing from 401(k) or other retirement funds or by creating a
subsidy to pay for premiums through Social Security distributions.249
Other components of the proposal included promoting hybrid products
through a change of tax law and supporting Long-term Care
Partnership Programs (described in further detail below). To promote
market incentives the LTC Commission proposed removing regulatory
burdens that are hampering private insurance carriers but did not
specify which regulations were barriers.250 Finally, the LTC Commission
recommended addressing Medicaid “crowd out” by increasing
qualification criteria to encourage individuals to take responsibility for
preparing for the future cost of care.251
Among their recommendations, only the shift in Medicaid
qualification criteria would influence purchase rates in the middle class.
Tying LTC insurance purchase rates to 401(k), life insurance, or
annuity assumes that purchasers have resources to invest in these
products, which have largely been accessible only to those with
significant incomes and assets. As a result, these products are unlikely
to be available to a majority of individuals. For example, in 2017 only
about one-third of individuals were contributing to a 401(k) account,
even though seventy-nine percent of individuals have employers who
are offering 401(k) benefits.252 Moreover, offering additional incentives
does not address limitations of prior tax incentive models that were not
successful in improving purchase rates, particularly for the middle class.
The LTC Commission’s recommendations failed to evaluate the core
issues limiting the private LTC insurance market.
2.

Commission on Long-term Care: Approach B

Approach B proposed two models to offer social insurance. First,
the LTC Commission proposed a comprehensive LTSS benefit in
Medicare Part A, triggered by physician certification that an individual
meets criteria.253 Under this proposal an individual would meet criteria
if they required assistance with at least two ADLs for more than ninety

249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Medicaid Crowd-Out of Private Long-Term Care
Insurance Demand: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Survey,
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12536, 2006).
252. Ben Steverman, Two-Thirds of Americans Aren’t Putting Money in Their
401(k),
BLOOMBERG,
(Feb.
7,
2018,
4:00
AM)
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0221/two-thirds-ofamericans-aren-t-putting-money-in-their-401-k.
253. LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 7.
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days and were expected to continue to need services.254 Individuals
whose mental or cognitive health interfered with independence would
also meet criteria.255 Benefits would cover “reasonable and necessary
LTSS.” For example, skilled nursing facility care, home health care,
adult day center services, and respite care options to support family or
other volunteer caregivers would be covered.256 The LTC Commission
proposed covering costs associated with the new benefits through an
increased Medicare payroll tax or the creation of a premium. The LTC
Commission recognized that because not all people who need LTSS are
Medicare eligible, some consideration needed to be given to expanding
eligibility for individuals who meet criteria but do not otherwise qualify
for Medicare.257
The LTC Commission’s second proposed model developed a basic
LTSS benefit within Medicare that would provide limited catastrophic
coverage.258 Under this proposal, individuals would be responsible for
providing private coverage or otherwise covering LTSS costs that do
not constitute financially “catastrophic” risks.259 Individuals would
qualify for benefits when they met a “specified threshold of functional
impairment” after a waiting period.260 The benefit would be a specified
dollar amount per day according to the level of impairment, individuals
would be able to elect a direct pay for service benefits instead of a cash
benefit.261 To pay for this proposal, the LTC Commission recommended
a surcharge on income tax for individuals near or at retirement age.262
These proposals provided potentially viable public options to
improve access to LTSS through a federal program, Medicare. However,
despite emphasizing the potential role of social insurance, the LTC
Commission recognized that such proposals will not be sufficient to

254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. To qualify for Medicare Part A, individuals must be older than 65, have
received disability benefits for more than 24 months, or receive regulardialysis or have had a kidney transplant. CTR FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES, ORIGINAL MEDICARE (PART A & B) ELIGIBILITY AND
ENROLLMENT (last visited Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.cms.gov/
Medicare/EligibilityandEnrollment/OrigMedicarePartABEligEnrol/inde
x.html; LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 8.
258. LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 8.
259. See id, at 60.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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address LTSS needs alone.263 As such, private insurance and Medicaid
will continue to serve critical roles in financing services.264 Given this
reality, to otherwise be successful, these approaches require that a
thriving private LTC insurance model be available to reduce the burden
on social programs.
3.

Additional Recommendations, Limitations, and Challenges

The LTC Commission provided recommendations outside the two
larger approaches for changes to the current system, including
improving benefits for individual who need LTSS to continue
employment, amending Medicare requirements for skilled nursing
facility coverage, and reevaluating Medicare coverage for home or
community-based services.265 The LTC Commission’s potential
approaches were broad sweeping. In the current political dynamic, with
high tensions over publicly funded state programs (i.e., Medicaid),
implementing LTC Commission’s recommendations would likely not be
feasible. The approaches also lack critical details, particularly regarding
the private market, to operationalizing proposals. A lack of a clear
recommendation from the LTC Commission runs the risk of piecemeal
adoption of solutions without evaluating the larger issues that
undermine the potential promise of a consistent and balanced solution.
C.

Partnership Programs

The Long-term Care Insurance Partnership Program (Partnership
Program) began with Programs in four states in the 1980s (California,
Connecticut, Indiana, and New York).266 The Federal Deficit Reduction
Act (2005) expanded the program nationally.267 The LTC Commission
also reiterated recommendations for support of Partnership Programs
in 2013.268 A Partnership Program attempts to reduce the burden on
Medicaid by incentivizing private LTC insurance purchase,269

263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 12.
266. Frequently Asked Questions, FED. LONG-TERM CARE INS. PARTNERSHIP
PROGRAM,
https://www.ltcfeds.com/help/faq/miscellaneous_partnership.html (last
visited Nov. 18, 2018).
267. Id.
268. LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 8.
269. Enid Kassner, Long-Term Care Insurance Partnership Programs, AARP
(Apr. 2016), https://www.aarp.org/health/medicare-insurance/info2006/fs124_ltc_06.html.
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specifically encouraging the middle class who would otherwise rely on
Medicaid.270
Partnership Programs are federally-supported, but stateoperated.271 In states with Partnership Programs, individuals who
purchase a tax-qualified LTC insurance policy may still qualify for
Medicaid after policy benefits have been depleted.272 Participants
benefit from the program through a mitigated spend down requirement
to meet Medicaid means eligibility tests.273 An individual with a
qualified LTC insurance policy receives a dollar-for-dollar asset
protection for each benefit dollar received under the LTC insurance
policy.274 For example, if an individual purchases a policy, then receives
$50,000 in benefits under that policy before applying for Medicaid
coverage, the individual is permitted to have the maximum state
designated assets plus $50,000 to qualify under the means test for
Medicaid.275
Nearly every state has implemented Partnership Programs.276
Despite the widespread adoption, Partnership Programs have
demonstrated a modest effect on LTC insurance purchase rates.277
Additionally, the programs have not successfully impacted purchase
rates in the middle class.278 Partnership Programs have had the most
impact on individuals with high asset levels, above the eightieth
percentile of asset ownership.279 The lack of success may be related to
under-education of individuals who would be appropriate candidates.
Recent reports demonstrate that up to seventy-five percent of
individuals over seventy-five years old are not aware that their state
offers a Partnership Program.280 This is particularly alarming in light of
data demonstrating that forty-five percent of adults report that a
Partnership Program would increase the attractiveness of an LTC
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See id.
274. FED. LONG-TERM CARE INS. PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM, supra note 268.
275. James C. Skeeles et. al., Basic Estate Planning: The Nursing Home
Dilemma, OHIO ST. UNIV.: SCH. OF FOOD, AGRIC., & ENVTL. SCI. (Jul. 6,
2012), https://ohioline.osu.edu/factsheet/EP-10.
276. Haizhen Lin & Jeffrey Prince, Determinants of Private Long‐Term Care
Insurance Purchase in Response to the Partnership Program, 51 HEALTH
SERV. RES. 687, 688 (2016).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id at 697.
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insurance policy.281 However, other flaws may be hindering the
programs’ success. Partnership Programs do not address high premiums
which impede purchase rates among the middle class.282 Because the
purchased LTC insurance must be tax qualified,283 the policy will
include inflation protection and other features that increase premium
costs. As a result, these programs have not accounted for a lack of
access to LTC insurance by those who remain “financially unsuitable”
to purchase a policy.
D.

Hybrid Options

Hybrid product proposals aim to address consumer concerns
regarding the value of benefits provided under traditional LTC
insurance policies. Hybrid products combine LTC insurance with other
types of insurance, for example a life or annuity policy.284 “Combination
products” were included in the LTC Commission’s Approach A, as a
mechanism to further reduce adverse selection risks, lower premiums,
and relax underwriting standards.285 The LTC Commission
recommended that a change in tax law that would “allow investment
and distribution in the LTC insurance portion through tax-advantaged
retirement accounts would encourage creation and uptake of these
policies.”286 Two types of hybrid products have been particularly
relevant to the market. First, life insurance hybrids allow individuals
to pay for LTSS expenses by accelerating the death benefit for a set
period (i.e., twenty-four or forty-eight months).287 If a policy holder
never uses the LTC insurance benefit, his or her heir receives the full
death benefit.288 Second, annuity combination products add LTC
insurance riders, which allow the individual to pay LTSS expenses out
of the existing annuity value.289 The hybrid structure provides benefits
for individual purchasers, including an investment that is not the “use
it or lose it” model that is risked in LTC insurance.290 Additionally, for
policies that utilize a single premium, policyholders do not face the risk
281. Id.
282. Id at 695.
283. Id at 691.
284. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 10.
285. LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 16.
286. Id. at 15.
287. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 11.
288. Id. at 10.
289. Id.
290. Wade Pfau, Hybrid Long-Term Care Insurance Policies, FORBES (Jan.
21,
2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadepfau/2016/01/14/
examining-long-term-care-insurance/#50540533afd9.
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of premium hikes.291 Life insurance hybrid products purchase rates have
increased in recent years, from nearly 73,000 in 2009 to over 305,000 in
2013.292 In 2015, 200,000 hybrid products were sold,293 marking an
increased interest in hybrid products.
The strengths of the potential value of these products must be
evaluated in the context of some weaknesses. First, these products do
not address accessibility challenges limiting purchase rates in the
middle class. Life insurance and annuity products require costly
investments upfront. For example, Fidelity offers a life insurance hybrid
product to individuals between the ages of thirty-five and sixty-nine
years old (sixty-five if he or she is a smoker) with a single premium of
$25,000.294 However, this is at the low end of single premium models,
other reports of premiums range up to $100,000.295 Thus, purchase rates
are consistently limited to those with significant assets. Some financial
advisors advise these products only to individuals with $500,000 to $2
million in assets.296 Second, hybrid products lack some benefits that are
included within traditional LTC insurance products. Hybrid products
may have more limitations on coverage, limited benefit periods, and
surrender periods (i.e., a waiting period before you can seek benefits).297
Third, hybrid products do not offer the same tax incentives associated
with LTC insurance policies because they are not “tax-qualified
policies.”298 Finally, analysists have also argued that such an investment
does not provide the best financial benefit, particularly in contrast to
purchasing an LTC insurance policy and investing the remainder of
available funds.299

291. Id.
292. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 11.
293. Eleanore Laise, Hybrid Insurance Policies Gaining Steam, KIPLINGER
(Jan. 2017), https://www.kiplinger.com/article/insurance/T036-C000S004-hybrid-policies-gaining-steam.html.
294. Long Term Care, FIDELITY.COM, https://www.fidelity.com/lifeinsurance/ long-term-care/details (last visited Nov. 13, 2018).
295. Universal Life Insurance, FIDELITY.COM, https://www.fidelity.com/lifeinsurance/universal-life-insurance/overview?print=true (last visited Nov.
13, 2018).
296. John F. Wasik, Hybrid Long-Term Care Policies Provide Case and Leave
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E.

Family and Informal Caregiver Insurance and Financial
Responsibility

The critical role of informal caregivers in LTSS has spurred several
recommendations that focus on the family and friends of individuals
needing LTSS. These proposals, either recommend that the family
member be the beneficiary of an insurance product or holding family
members responsible for financial consequences of LTSS.300 Below are
two examples representing a larger literature on the role of family
members and other informal caregivers.
Allison Hoffman argues that costs to family members and friends
as caregivers should be the focus of evaluation.301 In her argument, she
provides extensive evidence of the “next friend” risk.302 Professor
Hoffman describes “next-friend” risks as those that “arise in service of
something that we expect people to do and that we perceive as a public
benefit: providing care for people with serious illness or disability.”303 In
addition to providing evidence of caregiver burden, Professor Hoffman
details the historical changes in policy and law that have increased the
probability that care is provided at home with the use of informal
caregivers.304 Professor Hoffman proposes a social insurance for next
friend risk, which would rely on an individual with qualifying disability
designating a next friend.305 The next friend would receive benefits
through the social insurance to provide care or pay for services.306 This
proposal relies on an individual electing to enroll in a social insurance
and selecting an individual to serve in the “next friend” role. While this
proposal highlights key challenges facing caregivers, it does not account
for LTSS needs that extend beyond what informal caregivers can
provide. As a result, “next friend” social insurance would likely serve
as a supplement to a broader LTSS financing solution.
Legal scholars have also promoted the use of filial laws to hold
family members responsible for the costs of LTSS to mitigate Medicaid
burden.307 Filial responsibility laws are statutory obligations for family
members to be financially responsible for a family member, traditionally
300. Hoffman, supra note 35, at 219-20; See Jamie P. Hopkins et al.,
Leveraging Filial Support Laws Under the State Partnership Programs to
Encourage Long-Term Care Insurance, 20 WIDENER L. REV. 165, 189
(2014).
301. Hoffman, supra note 35, at 152.
302. Id. at 195.
303. Id. at 196.
304. Id. at 159-167.
305. Id. at 219, 220.
306. Id. at 220.
307. See id. at 177-178.
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used to hold parents responsible for children.308 Professor Hopkins and
colleagues recommend that these laws provide incentives for purchase
of LTC insurance through partnerships, by creating a disincentive for
not purchasing LTC insurance.309 This recommendation is limited by
inconsistent enforcement between states.310 An additional limitation of
this recommendation is the assumption of traditional familial
structures, which have continued to evolve. It is possible that the
enforcement of the filial law could result in an estranged family member
being held financially responsible for an individual with whom they
have no real relationship.
It is clear that family members and friends serve essential roles and
accept significant risks when serving as an informal caregiver. As a
result, there may be some place for providing insurance that assists
caregivers and reduces the burden of serving in this role. It is unclear,
however, whether the implementation of such a program would resolve
solutions for individuals who lack access to caregivers and or do not
exist within traditional family structures.

IV. Proposal
This proposal aims to (1) increase accessibility to LTC insurance
by amending regulation of underwriting practices; (2) improve
incentives for younger and healthier purchasers to balance the insurance
pool; and (3) motivate the market through improved regulations that
protect insurers from consequences of actuarial challenges. The proposal
prioritizes state legislative amendments as the primary mechanism for
regulating insurance broadly. To accomplish broad adoption of
proposed state legislative amendments, I argue for revisions to the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Long-term
Care Insurance Model Act and Regulation. The NAIC Model Act and
Regulation serve as an efficient and feasible tool to spur state
amendments. However, this proposal recognizes that such amendments
alone are not sufficient to address challenges to finance LTSS in the
United States. A successful LTSS financing system will include a
balance of private and public financing. This proposal seeks to increase
the role of private LTC insurance and reduce the burden on public
funding, particularly Medicaid. Reducing this burden will increase
feasibility to reform public insurance. The proposal begins at the federal
law, using federal legislation to incentivize states to amend their
legislation. Second, the proposal describes the NAIC Model Act and
Regulation as a proxy for state law to identify legislative and regulatory
308. Hopkins et al., supra note 302, at 189.
309. Id. at 197-98.
310. Id. at 192.
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sections that impede a thriving private LTC insurance market. Lastly,
this proposal will detail specific amendments to the NAIC Model Act,
with the intention that these amendments will be broadly adopted by
state legislators and regulators.
A.

Federal Law to Create State Incentives

A federal law that triggers state action is the initial step necessary
to triggering widely adopted changes. While current political dynamics
may create barriers for legislative amendments that increase regulation
of LTC insurers at the state level, a well-structured legislative proposal
could offer benefits to individuals and insurers. This proposal begins
with a federal act that would create a Medicaid program to provide
additional funding to states specific to LTSS and create a new Medicaid
LTSS insurance program that builds upon current coverage, available
only to individuals who purchase LTC insurance. This borrows from
the Partnership Programs, with some key differences. First, the
Medicaid program would supplement LTC insurance by covering
qualifying LTSS costs during the policy elimination period. This would
create an additional incentive by mitigating the out-of-pocket expenses
for individuals with LTC insurance policies. A second option would be
to tie legislative amendments to Medicaid LTSS catastrophic coverage
for individuals with LTC insurance policies who experience LTSS costs
that exceed LTC insurance coverage.
This proposed federal law will likely face challenges, including those
challenges raised against the ACA.311 However, historically, federal law
has used the tax and spending power to encourage state action.312 These
actions, including Medicaid expansion under the ACA, have previously
been challenged as violating state rights.313 By creating a new fund, and
not restricting funds for current programs, this proposal may meet
relevant constitutional requirements. The full constitutionality of this
proposal would need an in-depth evaluation, which will be saved for
another day. For purposes of remodeling the private LTC insurance
market, the constitutionality of such a federal law and its ability to
trigger broad state legislative amendments will be assumed.
The NAIC is a standard setting and regulatory supporting
organization with membership of insurance commissioners from all fifty
states, the District of Columbia, and five United States Territories.314
311. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
312. See id.
313. See A Guide to the Supreme Court’s Decision on the ACA’s Medicaid
Expansion, THE KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED (Aug. 1,
2012),
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/a-guide-to-thesupreme-courts-decision/.
314. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS, About,
index_about.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2018).
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The NAIC provides peer review, conducts oversight, and establishes
best practices for insurance regulation in individual states.315 To
accomplish these goals, the NAIC develops educational materials,
collects data on state law, and develops model laws to inform state
legislation and regulation standards and best practices.316 The NAIC
promulgated the Long-term Care Insurance Model Act (Model Act) and
Regulation (Model Regulation) to establish standards for LTC
insurance policies.317 The Model Act aims to promote LTC insurance
by establishing protections for long-term care applicants from unfair
and deceptive practices.318 The Model Act provides model language
among fourteen sections, for example: Definitions, Disclosure and
Performance Standards for Long-Term Care Insurance, Incontestability
Period, and Nonforfeiture Benefits.319
The Model Act was initially promulgated in 1987 and has been
regularly amended, most recently in 2017.320 Amendments often reflect
changes in federal law or other policy standards. For example, the
Model Act and Model Regulation added definitions and standards for
implementing criteria for “tax-qualified policies” in response to the 1996
passage of the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), which included a tax benefit for qualified LTC insurance
policies.321 Since the Model Act’s initial publication in 1987, state
legislatures have widely adopted it. As of 2015, all fifty states have
legislation that is either derived from or have fully adopted the Model
Act.322 In a study examining the Model Act’s “preexisting condition”
provision,323 twenty-four states were consistent with the Model Act and
a majority of the remaining states were substantially similar.324
Evidence of the broad adoption of the Model Act demonstrates the
influence of the NAIC on informing state LTC insurance legislation and
regulation. As a result, the NAIC Model Act and Model Regulation
serve as tools for understanding state law on LTC insurance and for
amending state law to improve market standards.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL ACT § 1;
NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL
REGULATION § 1.
318. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL ACT § 1.
319. Id.
320. Id. at § 14.
321. Id. at § 4.
322. See id.
323. Id. at § 6(B).
324. See Arias et al., supra note 97, at 490.

164

Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019
The Last Hope: How Starting Over Could Save Private Long-Term Care
Insurance

Several Model Act sections have a direct impact on access to LTC
insurance, benefits and incentives, and protections for the LTC
insurance market. Premium setting standards permeate multiple
challenges to a strong private LTC insurance market. First, the Model
Act and Model Regulation establish baseline standards for setting
premiums. Premium rate increases require commissioner approval
which can interfere with insurers’ abilities to adjust rates, even when
justified by actuarial risk.325 Under the NAIC Model Regulation,
seventy percent of the premium increases collected must be applied to
benefits, and insurers must offer a new and comparable policy to
individuals affected by the increase without underwriting.326 Second, the
NAIC Model Act and Regulation Insurers provide discretion to regulate
and approve loss ratios and premium setting practices.327 Under the
Model Regulation, a loss ratio is reasonable if it is no less than sixty
percent; meaning that sixty cents of every dollar collected through
premiums must be used to pay for benefit claims.328 The remainder of
the proposal will address NAIC Model law as a proxy for state law that
impacts underwriting and incentives and benefits.
B.

Underwriting

Medical denials reduce the pool of eligible participants and limit
access to LTC insurance. Current state law supports the broad use of
health information during underwriting.329 The Model Act and Model
Regulation explicitly permit the use of health information in
underwriting in multiple sections.330 This can first be seen in the
mandate that insurers use clear and unambiguous questions to
“ascertain the health condition of the applicant” accompanies the
prohibition of post-claim underwriting.331 The same section provides
mechanisms to rescind a policy or deny benefits due to
misrepresentation on an application.332 In a related section, the Model
Regulation requires that the insurer request specific documentation of

325. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 71.
326. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL
REGULATION § 20(C), (H).
327. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL ACT § 6.
328. Id. at § 5(C).
329. See Arias et al., supra note 97, at 492.
330. See id.
331. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL
REGULATION § 11(A).
332. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL ACT
§ 11(C); NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL
REGULATION § 11(C).
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the applicant’s health status if the applicant is over eighty years old.333
Lastly, the Model Act includes a preexisting condition provision that
prohibits insurers from using preexisting condition status for coverage
decisions after a six-month limitation period following enrollment.334
Importantly, the same provision explicitly permits insurers to use
health information for underwriting purposes.335 Forty-three states have
legislative or regulatory provisions that are consistent with the Model
Act,336 which states “[t]he definition of ‘preexisting condition’ does not
prohibit an insurer from using an application form designed to elicit the
complete health history of an applicant, and, on the basis of the answers
on that application, from underwriting in accordance with the insurers
established underwriting standards.”337
This language creates broad unlimited discretion for collecting and
using health information. Yet, this broad discretion has not yet led to
accurate actuarial analysis.338 The proposed revised Model Act, and
subsequently state law, will:
1) create disincentives for withholding health information on
an application for LTC insurance;
2) remove the barrier for individuals who know of an
increased risk status from applying for insurance;
3) remove LTC insurance eligibility as a barrier to seeking
health information that could offer benefit to the
individual;
4) protect insurer profitability and sustainability by
permitting insures to collect and use health information,
in a limited structure, to mitigate adverse selection;
5) reduce the percentage of individuals medically denied;
6) improve accuracy in underwriting practices; and
333. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL
REGULATION § 11(C)(3).
334. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL ACT
§ 6(C)4.
335. Id.
336. Arias et al., supra note 96, at 493.
337. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL ACT
§ 6(C)4; SHORT-TERM CARE INSURANCE MODEL ACT § 6(B)(4) (NAT’L
ASS’N OF INS. COMMN’R 2017).
338. Temkin-Greener et al., supra note 111, at 356.
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7) ultimately increase the eligibility pool for LTC insurance.
Proposed amendments will create an improved structure that
specifies boundaries for the use of medical information in underwriting.
The new structure minimizes the use of knock-out conditions in
exchange for risk evaluation based on stage and traits of health
conditions for determining eligibility and premiums. The proposed
amendments prohibit insurers from using predictive health information
(i.e., genetic information) from constituting a knock-out condition.
Insurers would, however, be permitted to use that information to set
premiums within rate limits established by the insurance commissioner
and informed by scientific value of predictive information. The
amendments establish boundaries regarding underwriting for chronic
conditions that have manifested based on expected disability.
The proposed amendments incorporate the known loss doctrine to
reduce potential adverse selection and moral hazard risks for insurers.339
The known loss doctrine permits insurers to deny coverage for losses
that the individual insured knew were probable at the time of
enrollment.340 This would accomplish two purposes (1) protect insurers
from liability for coverage of claims that the insured knew would occur
at the time of enrollment; and (2) further discourage insureds from
failing to disclose risks that were known.
The proposed amendments harness advances to detect disease risks
and predictive information and improve actuarially analysis accuracy.
Diseases that lead to significant functional loss (e.g., Alzheimer’s
disease) can now be identified at earlier stages.341 Looking to
Alzheimer’s disease as an example of these advancements can
demonstrate the outdated approach to LTC insurance underwriting
currently implemented. Researchers have identified biomarkers of the
hallmark plaques and tangles associated with Alzheimer’s disease.342
These biomarkers, which are currently not used clinically for
asymptomatic individuals, have the capacity to identify disease

339. Diana S. Donaldson & Jennifer DuFault James, The “Known Loss”
Doctrine – Whose Knowledge and of What?, 8 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 43, 4748 (1996).
340. Id.
341. G. McKhann et al., Clinical Diagnosis of Alzheimer’s Disease: Report of
the NINCDS-ADRDA Work Group Under the Auspices of Department of
Health and Human Services Task Force on Alzheimer’s Disease, 34
NEUROLOGY 939 (1984).
342. Clifford R. Jack et al., NIA-AA Research Framework: Toward a
Biological Definition of Alzheimer’s Disease, 14 ALZHEIMER’S &
DEMENTIA 535-36, 539 (2018).
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pathology up to twenty years prior to symptom onset.343 Individuals
who are positive for these biomarkers are at an increased risk for
developing symptomatic Alzheimer’s disease, a leading cause of
dementia.344 Additionally, genetic markers can identify individuals who
are at an increased (but rarely certain) risk of Alzheimer’s disease.345
The widespread movement to diagnose, detect, and treat diseases at
earlier stages will offer critical public health benefits to reduce disease
burden. Individuals at risk for disease are, however, likely to be denied
or face prohibitively high premiums in the LTC insurance underwriting
process. LTC insurance underwriting practices are unfavorable to
individuals who will likely need LTSS and could benefit from LTC
insurance. But, by excluding a population of at-risk enrollees, insurers
could forgo up to twenty years of premiums without claims. These
advancements should encourage legal amendments to increase
eligibility, structure underwriting practices to use different kinds of
health information, and emphasize the inclusion of scientifically
accurate information regarding disease to inform actuarial risk
assessments.
C.

Proposed Provision: Underwriting Standards Using Health
Information

Health information is to be defined as information collected during
a clinical encounter between an individual (patient) and a health care
provider with the purpose of improving individual health. Health
information may include, but is not limited to: diagnostic information,
treatment status, genetic or other biomarker test results that confer an
“at risk status,” predictive information indicating future disease status,
or family health history.
1. (a)
Insurers are permitted to use comprehensive applications
to collect health information regarding an applicant’s current or
future health status as relevant to current or future use of longterm care services and supports.

(b)
Health information is not relevant and may not be
collected if it does not relate to a current or future (1) disability
that will interfere with activities of daily living, or (2) cognitive
impairment requiring supervision.
2. Insurers are prohibited from denying an insurance policy
application based on genetic information, biomarker
343. See id. at 537, 539.
344. Id. at 539-40.
345. Donald H. Taylor Jr et. al., Genetic Testing for Alzheimer’s and LongTerm Care Insurance, 29 HEALTH AFF. 102, 104 (2010).
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information, or family history for a risk of future disease: (1)
if the disease has not yet manifested; and (2) without evidence
of risk for disease and future loss of function, according to
medical opinion or documentation in the individual’s disclosed
medical record.
(a)
Insurers may develop a risk scale for determining
eligibility or premium rates that incorporates applicants’ risk
for future loss according to genetic or biomarker information
along with other factors. Factors are to be approved by the
insurance commissioner and must include, at a minimum, the
applicant’s age and projected age of onset for the relevant
disease.
i.

Insurers must submit a list of “knock-out” conditions and
seek approval from the insurance commissioner for
conditions that the insurer will deny based on genetic or
biomarker risk for a debilitating illness, when the disease
has yet to manifest.

ii.

Insurers are not permitted to limit or deny benefit claims
based on genetic information or biomarkers for a disease
that is inconsistent with treatment of other preexisting
conditions as established in National Association of
Insurance Commissioners Model Act §5(C) (year).

(b)
An insurer may deny an application based on genetic
or biomarker risk information for a condition if:
i.

The disease has manifested and the applicant is projected
to seek benefits from the policy within 3 years of enrollment
based on current medical opinion and standards; or

ii.

The disease has not yet manifested, but the applicant is
within 2 years of expected age of onset with a rapid
progressing disease, according to current medical standards
related to the specific disease process.

3. (a)
An insurer may deny a policy application for an
individual who is diagnosed and symptomatic for an illness or
condition that the insurance commissioner has designated “high
risk.”
(b)
The insurance commissioner shall maintain criteria
and a list of conditions that constitute “high risk.” “High risk”
shall not be defined more restrictively than a condition that will
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lead to catastrophically high LTSS costs which cannot be
covered by projected premiums.
4. Insurers may develop an underwriting “scale of risk” to be used
internally for determining eligibility or premium rates that
incorporates applicants’ risk for future loss based on diagnoses
of a chronic condition or illness that will lead to loss of function.
A proposed scale must be approved by the insurance
commissioner and be based on the individual’s age and
projected long-term care services and supports needs.
5. (a)
An insurer is prohibited from denying an application
for conditions that constitute a “minimal risk.”
(b)
The insurance commissioner shall maintain criteria
and a list of conditions that constitute “minimal risk.”
“Minimal risk” shall not be defined more restrictively than a
condition that will not lead to significant long-term care
services and supports costs, is unlikely to lead to disability that
would interfere with daily activities, or is unlikely to require the
use of long-term care services and supports within 20 years of
enrollment.
6. Insurers may develop a risk scale for determining eligibility or
premium rates that incorporates applicants’ risk for future loss
according to past medical history only as predictive of future
functional loss. A proposed scale must be approved by the
insurance commissioner and be based on the individual’s age
and projected long-term care services and supports needs.
7. The known loss doctrine shall apply. Insurers are not liable for
coverage of long-term care services and supports costs
associated with disability that the insured knew would occur at
the time of enrollment. This doctrine does not grant insurers
the authority to require or request diagnostic, risk, or predictive
biomarker or genetic tests.
D. Discussion of Proposal

The proposed amendments’ language incorporates new standards
for using health information for underwriting purposes. The
amendments adopt a balance between absolutely prohibiting LTC
insurers to use health information and providing broad discretion. The
proposed regulation would provide additional implementation language,
including a medical certification process for amendments that include
prognostic information (e.g., “within 2 years of the expected onset”).
The proposed language and amendments are extensive and add
additional layers of complexity. However, this additional detailed
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approach of evaluating policyholder risk will lead to improved accuracy
in the underwriting process. An alternative approach would be to
implement a community rating structure; a consistent rate set across
all individuals would reduce the consequences of medical
underwriting.346 In the context of a voluntary enrollment program,
community rating may increase adverse selection. Community rating
may dissuade younger and healthier individuals from enrolling if they
will face similar premiums as their older and less healthy counterparts.
A revised underwriting structure provides the core revisions to this
proposal and seeks to provide access to LTC insurance to an expanded
population. This will also increase the size of the insured population.
Therefore, risks will be more broadly distributed. The continued, but
restricted, use of health information permits insurers to screen for high
risk policyholders. This restricted structure addresses one of the
limitations in the CLASS Act. The proposed underwriting amendments
will trigger other changes throughout the LTC insurance market,
including lowering premiums. Therefore, in order to protect the market,
additional measures must be initiated, including improving the quality
of LTC insurance as a product and providing market incentives.
E.

Incentives and Benefits

Incentives and policy benefits will be critical to motivating younger
and healthier individuals to purchase LTC insurance policies. Increasing
the number of younger and healthier purchasers is essential to maintain
a voluntary market and support the newly revised underwriting
practices. Incentives can include the benefits provided under a policy
as well as the external incentives which influence individual or insurers’
decision to participate in the market. This proposal recommends
improved benefits that reduce barriers to accessing LTSS, external
incentives to encourage individual participation, and market incentives
for insurers.
1.

Improving Purchase Rates and an Improved Insurance Product

Incentives include positive and negative influences to motivate
behavior. In the context of LTC insurance a balance between the two
may be most successful. Policy benefits and external incentives increase
the value of a policy in relationship to the associated premiums.
Disincentives, including penalties, may discourage individuals from
waiting to enroll until later in life or when chronic conditions begin.

346. Thomas D. Snook & Ronald G. Harris, Adverse Selection and the
Individual Mandate, MILLIMAN HEALTH REFORM BRIEFING PAPER, Oct.
2009.
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a.

Policy Benefits

LTC insurance policy benefits are limited by benefit triggers,
benefit caps, and elimination periods. As a result, LTC insurance
policyholders must still pay for a portion of LTSS expenses. In order to
improve the value of an LTC insurance policy, the entire structure must
be redesigned to increase the benefit to the purchaser without overly
increasing premiums.
The proposed new structure shifts LTC insurance from a premium
model to an accumulation or savings model. This proposal is consistent
with evidence of consumer criticism that policies do not include nonforfeiture benefits, which would allow policyholders to receive a refund
on a portion of premiums.347 An accumulation model would provide
purchasers with the option to receive a refund of a percentage of
premiums at a designated time point (i.e., a given age or years paid
into a policy). Here the model would incorporate a non-use premium
refund that would provide policyholders with a refund if, at reaching
the given time point, they have not needed LTSS or sought benefits
under their policy. The refund would increase based on premiums paid,
which would encourage younger purchasers. This model could also be
used as a disincentive by requiring purchase by a specified age to qualify
for the non-use refund benefit. An accumulation model could also
encourage healthy behavior and address risks of moral hazards to limit
the use of LTSS.
There are potential consequences of incentivizing non-use of
benefits, including sub-par care. Additionally, specific protections
would be needed to limit the risk of abuse and conflict of interest for
caregivers who serve as decision-makers. A caregiver may be improperly
motivated by the refund and refrain from seeking LTSS on behalf of
the individual, despite needs for services. Criteria and regulation of
refunds could address these risks (e.g., requiring certification of “nonneed” by a health care provider).348 Practically, policy makers would
need to conduct analysis to establish standards, including the “purchase
by” age and refund percentages. This will also require negotiation with
insurers to avoid disrupting the market by loss of profit associated with
refunds. This restructuring would require new legislative language and
re-defining LTC insurance.
Current use of benefit triggers, elimination periods, and benefit
limits serve an important role to reduce claims costs and reduce
premiums. However, these are the same mechanisms which are cited as
impeding individuals from perceiving LTC insurance as a valuable

347. DOTY & SHIPLEY, supra note 23, at 4.
348. COMMITTEE ON FAMILY CAREGIVING FOR OLDER ADULTS, FAMILIES
CARING FOR AGING AMERICA, 13 (Richard Schulz & Jill Eden, eds., 2016).
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product.349 Benefit triggers provide an important role in assuring
appropriate use of LTC insurance benefits for LTSS services. Under the
NAIC Model regulation, an LTC insurance policy “shall condition the
payment of benefits on the determination of the insured’s ability to
perform activities of daily living and on cognitive impairment.” While
benefit triggers create a hurdle for individuals, the availability of an
appeal process under the Model Regulation provides oversight on the
process.350 To mitigate the adverse consequences of the elimination
period, the proposed Medicaid fund provided to states would provide
coverage during the elimination period.
This leaves the adverse effects of benefit caps. There are two
underlying components of addressing caps. First, excessive LTSS costs
could contribute to the gap between policy benefits and cost of care.
Cost reform is not a focus of this article but should be recognized as a
contributor to financing issues. Second, benefit caps are important to
protect insurers from losses exceeding premium contributions of
policyholders. Insurer protections, including the “vesting” period
proposed in the CLASS Act, may provide a mechanism to assure that
policyholders have contributed sufficient funds to support increasing
benefit caps and minimize the gap between benefits and LTSS costs.
Addressing the consequences of benefit triggers, elimination periods,
and benefit caps will increase the value of an LTC insurance policy and
motivate purchasers. These revisions do not address the need to
incentivize purchase in the middle class. External benefits may help fill
that role.
b.

External Benefits

Prior tax incentives have been nominally successful at improving
purchase rates and unsuccessful at motivating the middle class to
purchase policies.351 Prior research has demonstrated that tax and other
financial incentives are broadly supported, including government
support of LTC insurance purchase using funds from an individual
retirement account.352 A strategic approach which accounts for the
financial realities of the middle class will be the key element of a
successful external incentive. I propose a tax incentive available only to
individuals whose income classify them as “middle class” in their
geographical area. Such a mechanism would overcome a critical hurdle
of incentivizing purchase by individuals in the middle class, an outcome
not previously achieved. A specific tax benefit or subsidy as part of this
349. See NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 51.
350. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL
REGULATION § 31(D)(1).
351. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 21.
352. DOTY & SHIPLEY, supra note 23.
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model would require a larger analysis to determine what degree of
incentive would motivate the target population to change behavior.
c.

Disincentives

An individual mandate for LTC insurance is politically
implausible.353 However, other potential disincentives could encourage
earlier purchase of LTC insurance. For example, implementing penalties
for enrolling after a specific age may increase younger purchase rates.
There are multiple options for developing penalties, depending on fiscal
and economic feasibility. For example, individuals who enroll after
sixty-five face a penalty, but not a total block, for seeking coverage
within two years of the policy enrollment date. This type of penalty
would need to be designed to not override current preexisting condition
protections, which currently prohibit insurers from denying coverage
based on a preexisting condition after a six-month limitation.
Regardless of the type of disincentive chosen, a successful disincentive
will balance encouraging purchase rates and protecting the market, but
not creating barriers to accessing LTC insurance or services. In this
context, penalties (e.g., standardized increased premiums), criteria for
incentives, and the non-benefit refund that are focused towards specific
populations (i.e., older purchasers) would motivate purchase without
barring access.
2.

Market Incentives

The primary focus of this proposal is to improve LTC insurance as
a product, make it more accessible, and increase purchase rates.
However, this proposal must include incentives for insurers to join and
stay in the market. Without such incentives, the proposal is at risk of
failure by over emphasizing protections which will benefit policyholders,
but potentially deplete profits of insurers to the detriment of the
market. Specifically, increasing the eligibility and accessibility of
insurance can disrupt the market by increasing rates of adverse
selection.354 Additionally, without additional regulatory market
incentives, insurers may attempt to compete by making their policies
less attractive to “sicker” or less ideal policy holders through the
benefits offered or terms of their policies (e.g., elimination periods),
undermining the goals of the proposal.355 This article proposes a time
limited federal subsidy for LTC insurers and modeling mechanism
implemented in the ACA. The ACA incorporated measures including
reinsurance, risk corridors, and risk adjustment (the “Three R’s”) to
353. Feder, supra note 86, at 59.
354. CYNTHIA COX ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., EXPLAINING HEALTH
CARE REFORM: RISK ADJUSTMENT, REINSURANCE, AND RISK CORRIDORS
(2016).
355. Id.
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accomplish broader goals, reduce the consequences of adverse selection,
and minimize the impact of moral hazard.356
Risk adjustment aims to de-incentivize risk selection practices that
prioritization of “ideal” candidates.357 Risk adjustment balances the
market by distributing funds from insurers with practices that lead to
healthier enrollees to insurer who accept high risk enrollees.358
Reinsurance insures against the potential catastrophic consequences for
insurers who experience high expenses or costs due to rare claims by
policy holders.359 The program was implemented to stabilize the health
insurance market.360 Under the ACA, the federal government reinsures
companies by paying a percentage of the rare policy holder claims that
exceed a specific amount.361 This program had a step down and limited
application between 2014 and 2016.362 The government paid the highest
percentage in 2014, decreased the percentage in 2015, and ended the
program in 2016.363 In the three years that the ACA reinsurance
program was in effect, premiums dropped in the individual health
insurance market as much as eleven percent.364 Risk corridors aim to
incentivize accurate premium calculations by re-distributing financial
gains or losses that exceed predicted loss or gains.365 Under the ACA, if
an insurer’s gains or losses are within three percent of those predicted,
the company absorbed the financial consequences.366 However, if the
gains or losses are between three and eight percent, the company was
either reimbursed or contributed fifty percent of the gains or losses for
redistribution.367

356. Id. at 12.
357. Id. at 3.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 6.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 10.
362. See id. at 11-12.
363. Id.
364. Timothy Jost, CMS Releases 2016 ACA Marketplace Reinsurance and
Risk Adjustment Data, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 1, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170701.060929/full/.
365. COX, supra note 356, at 2.
366. John Greenberg, Krauthammer: Obamacare Has Hidden Insurance
Company
Bailout,
POLITIFACT
(Jan.
13,
2014),
https://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/jan/13/charleskrauthammer/krauthammer-obamacare-has-hidden-insurance-company/.
367. Id.
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A targeted goal of the ACA was to expand and improve coverage,
much like the goals established in this article.368 In the context of health
insurance, the ACA was successful at accomplish those goals through
the end of President Obama’s presidency.369 However, the ACA faced
political challenges370 which are informative when considering a reform
for LTC insurance, which is engendered with significant complexities.
The ACA also included the individual mandate, which has seen been
repealed.371 Given the political challenges associated with the ACA, a
reform for LTC insurance must be tempered and avoid the naïve trap
of believing that directly modeling any reform after the ACA would
necessarily be successful. However, implementing the Three R’s
approach to incentivize market participation would improve market
security to allow for insurers to bare additional risks associated with
proposals that increase eligibility. These measures (the Three R’s)
would protect insurers from losses, incentivize change in underwriting
practices, and reduce the impact of adverse selection and moral hazard.
However, several challenges will need to be addressed, including the
potential consequences of implementing these measures in a market
within a market that has fewer insurers than the health insurance
market. This is particularly relevant when considering risk adjustment,
which incorporates distribution of funds between insurers. As a result,
these mechanisms will only be successful with a growth in the number
of insurers in the market. A federal subsidy or corporate tax benefit for
new insurers to enter the market and for current insurers will help
increase the number of insurers and provide the necessary financial
environment for adopting the Three R’s.

V. Conclusions and Limitations
The proposal has some limitations and challenges that need to be
addressed before implementation. Primarily, an economic analysis is
needed to simulate potential changes proposed. This would include
evaluating feasibility of market changes to adjust premiums and
calculate ranges for incentives to appropriately motivate purchase rates.
The purpose of this article was to identify a route for revisions through
current legal standards, the economic analysis would be a natural next
step. Additional practical limitations include political hurdles to
368. Barack Obama, United States Health Care Reform Progress to Date and
Next Steps, JAMA 525, 526 (2016).
369. Id. at 527.
370. Id.
371. See Sy Mukherjee, The GOP Tax Bill Repeals Obamacare’s Individual
Mandate. Here’s What That Means for You, FORTUNE (Dec. 20, 2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/12/20/tax-bill-individual-mandateobamacare/.
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propose amendments through the legislative process. Political
challenges would be closely related to financial solutions for the
proposal, including any investment by public governments.
Resolving failures plaguing private LTC insurance will not “fix” all
financing challenges facing LTSS. However, strengthening the private
market will reduce the burden placed on individuals and Medicaid. A
public option, including those recommended by the LTC Commission,
will be central to a balanced solution. Public options are particularly
important options for individuals without financial means to purchase
private insurance. Despite these limitations, improving the private LTC
insurance market is a promising avenue to improving LTSS financing
options.
This article proposes redesigning the current LTC insurance model
using the NAIC Long-term Care Insurance Model Act to establish new
state legislative standards. This proposal is the first to closely
evaluating characteristics and insurers’ practices that are contributing
to LTC insurance market failure and low purchase rates. The solution
proposed is the first of its kind and addresses the limitations of
previously proposed solutions. The article’s proposals to increase access
through revised underwriting standards, improve incentives to purchase
LTC insurance, and integrate market protections reflect critical changes
to save LTC insurance from the “death spiral.”
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